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this occur, the decision of Virginia Citizens is destined to join Lochner v.
New York as the "twentieth century archetype of a judicial mistake."
45
Paul Preston
STATE PROTECTION OF THE VIABLE UNBORN CHILD AFTER ROE V. WADE:
How LITTLE, How LATE?
In 1974, Missouri enacted a statute prohibiting the abortion of a viable
fetus, except when necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.'
Viability was defined as "that stage of fetal development when the life of
the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural
or artificial life-supportive systems." 2 Two physicians sued for injunctive
and declaratory relief, claiming that abortion could not constitutionally be
prohibited prior to the 28th week of gestation. The United States Supreme
Court held that a state may prohibit the abortion of a fetus which might
survive outside the womb, regardless of the period of gestation, unless the
abortion is necessary to preserve maternal life or health. Planned Parent-
hood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).'
Until recently, regulation and prohibition of abortion were generally
thought to be constitutionally within the police power of the states. Abortion
had been a crime at common law, 4 and specific anti-abortion statutes were
45. STEPHENSEN, supra note 37, at 218.
1. VERNON'S ANN. MO. STAT. §§ 188.010 - .085 (Supp. 1975), enacted by
Missouri Laws 1974, p. 809 §§ 1-16.
2. Id. § 188.015(3) (Supp. 1975), enacted by Missouri Laws 1974, p. 809 § 2(3).
3. The Court's treatment of the following subjects in the instant case is not
discussed in this Note: standing, state requirement of a woman's "informed
consent" prior to an abortion, state requirement of spousal consent prior to an
abortion, state requirement of parental consent prior to an abortion performed upon
an unmarried minor, and reporting and record-keeping requirements. The Court's
holding on a state prohibition of the saline amniocentesis method of abortion after the
first 12 weeks of gestation is discussed in the text at notes 62-68, infra. The Court's
holding on a state requirement that a physician take measures to preserve a fetus' life
and health during abortion is discussed in the text at notes 58-61, infra.
4. 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES *50; 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 129; 2 H.
BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE *279. But the Court ex-
pressed uncertainty as to whether the common law regarded abortion as homicide,
or a lesser crime, or never "firmly established" as a crime at all, in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 132-36 (1973). The Court relied heavily on Means, The Phoenix of
Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise
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enacted within a few decades after the ratification of the United States
Constitution. 5 By the time of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment in
1868, most states had such statutes. 6 During the 1960's a sustained national
effort to achieve the enactment of permissive abortion laws met with limited
success: most states continued to prohibit abortions except to save the life
of the mother, 7 and no state permitted an abortion after the 24th week of
gestation, except in limited "therapeutic" instances. 8 By 1973, the Sup-
reme Court had declined invitations to find state anti-abortion laws uncon-
stitutional for vagueness, 9 overbreadth, 0 and denial of substantive rights. "
In Roe v. Wade1 2 and its companion, Doe v. Bolton, 13 the Court for the
from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-
Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L. F. 335 (1971), for its doubts about the status of abortion as
a common-law crime. The Means article is rebutted in Byrn, An American Tragedy:
the Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REV, 807, 815-27 (1973).
5. E.g., CONN. STAT., Tit. 20, §§ 14, 16 (1821); N.Y. REV. STAT., pt. 4, ch. I,
Tit. 2, §§ 8, 9, pp. 12-13 (1828) (cited in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 175 n.l) (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
6. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 175 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 118 & n.2 (1973).
8. By 1970, fourteen states had adopted abortion laws based on the American
Law Institute's "model" statute, set forth in the appendix to Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179, 205-07 (1973). The ALI proposal banned all abortions at any stage of gestation,
except in "therapeutic" cases. Four other states-Alaska, Hawaii, New York and
Washington-had adopted laws more permissive than the ALl model, and all others
had more restrictive laws, usually permitting abortion only to save the mother's life.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 139-40 & n.37 (1973). Among the more permissive states,
New York and Washington prohibited "non-therapeutic" abortions after 24 weeks
and after quickening, respectively. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3) (McKinney Supp.
1970); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.060 (Supp. 1970). Alaska's and Hawaii's
permissive abortion statutes, both passed in 1970, defined abortion as a procedure to
"terminate the pregnancy of a nonviable fetus." ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.060 (1970);
HAWAni REV. STAT. § 453-16 (Supp. 1970).
9. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 67-73 (1971).
10. In Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970), the district court
granted a declaratory judgment that a state statute prohibiting an abortion unless
necessary to save the life of the mother was unconstitutionally overbroad. The
defendant district attorney appealed from the declaratory judgment, and the Sup-
reme Court dismissed the appeal on other grounds. 400 U.S. 1 (1970). A subsequent
district court judgment granting the plaintiffs injunctive relief, 320 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.
Wis. 1970), was vacated by the Supreme Court on other grounds, 402 U.S. 903 (1971),
leaving the "overbreadth" issue unresolved. See also note 11, infra.
1I. See Polityka, From Poe to Roe: a Bickelian View oftheAbortion Decision-
Its Timing and Principle, 53 NEB. L. REV. 31,47 (1974). Among the opportunities the
Court had to reach the merits on abortion were United States v. Vuitch, cited in note
9, supra, and Babbitz v. McCann, cited in note 10, supra.
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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first time announced constitutional standards by which all fifty state
anti-abortion laws were effectively nullified. 4 Roe held that a "right of
privacy," not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but secured either by
the ninth amendment or by the fourteenth amendment, 15 "is broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy." 16
Roe did not, however, recognize an absolute right to unregulated
abortion. The state was held to have interests in maternal health,17 as well as
in the protection of "potential life,"' 18 justifying some restrictions on
abortion. Specifically, the Court held that the state's interest in protecting
the mother becomes "compelling" at about the twelfth week of gestation
(the end of the "first trimester ")'9 and at that point the state may regulate the
manner in which abortions are performed. The Court also held that the
interest in potential life does not become compelling until viability, defined
by the Court as that point when the fetus is "potentially able to live outside
the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid.'"'2 Only after viability may
states actually forbid abortion, and then only when the procedure is not
14. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973).
15. 410 U.S. at 152.
16. Id. at 153. The Court found that many Americans regard the unborn child as a
person entitled to full protection from the moment of conception. Id. at 160-61.
However, the Court also found that the unborn are not protected by the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 158. Examining the Texas statute in question, the Court further
determined that (1) since the law permitted abortion to save the life of the mother, (2)
since the mother herself was not subject to criminal penalties for abortion, and (3)
since criminal abortion carried a lower penalty than murder, it did not reflect a
genuine belief in the humanity of the fetus. Id. at 157 n.54. But see Epstein,
Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: the Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT.
REV. 159, 179-80 (1973). Thus the holding in Roe technically leaves open the
possibility that a state might show its anti-abortion law to be based on the conviction
that human life begiris at conception, and therefore to be a constitutional protection
of persons within its jurisdiction. Speaking directly to this issue in dictum, however,
the majority in Roe said a state may not "by adopting one theory of life.., override
the rights of the pregnant woman . I.." "d. at 162. Subsequent to Roe, Rhode Island
passed an anti-abortion law specifically declaring that the unborn child is a human
being from the moment of conception; this law was found unconstitutional under the
rule of Roe. Doe v. Israel, 358 F. Supp. 1193 (D.R.I. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993
(1974). However, the case did not involve a law whose legislative history reflected a
long and settled state policy, outside the context of the recent abortion controversy,
that unborn children be afforded the full protection of state law.
17. 410 U.S. at 150, 163.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 163.
20. Id. at 160.
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necessary to preserve the mother's life or health. 2' The Court stated that
viability "is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may, occur
earlier, even at 24 weeks."
22
Doe set the standard for determining whether an abortion is necessary
to preserve maternal life or health: the "best clinical judgment" of the
physician chosen by the woman desiring the abortion. 23 A state's compel-
ling interest in the potential life of the viable unborn child does not justify
legislative restriction of post-viability abortions to situations in which the
mother's physical health is endangered; the physician's judgment "may be
exercised in light of all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, famil-
ial and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient.''24
The Court in Roe gave no convincing explanation for its choice of
viability as the point at which state protection of the fetus might begin.
Unlike conception, quickening, and birth, the point of viability signals no.
inherent change in the fetus; rather, it is a function of the available
life-sustaining apparatus. 5 Nor did the Court explain why a being with a
present capability of "meaningful life outside the mother's womb," 26
biologically identical to a prematurely born infant of the same age, 27 is still
only "potentially" human, and why it may be destroyed to protect the
emotional, psychological or familial well-being of the mother. 28 Finally,
21. Id. at 163-64.
22. Id. at 160. The Court cited L. HELLMAN & J. PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS
OBSTETRICS 493 (14th ed. 1971), and DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY
1689 (24th ed. 1965).
23. 410 U.S. at 191-92. The statute challenged in Doehad restricted the exercise
of the physician's judgment to certain specific situations, and further limited the
physician's judgment by requiring corroboration by other physicians and approval by
hospital committees. The district court ruled that all of these restrictions were
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court ruling of unconstitution-
ality of the certification and corroboration requirements; although the other restric-
tions were not before the Court in Doe, id. at 192-200, they were unconstitutional
under the Roe guidelines. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
24. 410 U.S. at 192.
25. For the view that viability is an illogical point to begin state protection of the
fetus, see, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 924-25; Comment, Medical Responsibility for Fetal Survival Under
Roe, 10 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 444, 449 n.28. For a defense of the
point of viability as a practical choice, more related to the prevailing practices and to
the aesthetic norms of society than to inherent changes in the fetus, see Tribe, supra
note 14, at 26-28.
26. 410 U.S. at 163.
27. See Byrn, supra note 4, at 807 n.5; Harrison, The Supreme Court and
Abortional Reform: Means to an End, 19 N.Y.L. F. 685, 688-89 (1974). See also
Means, supra note 4, at 409-10; Tribe, supra note 14, at 27.
28. See Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: the Need for a Life-protective
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the Court in Roe did not indicate what measures, if any, a state might take to
advance its compelling interest in protecting a viable fetus when the
mother's physician has determined that an abortion is necessary for health
reasons. 29
The uncertainty about the reasons behind the Court's guidelines might
have been of philosophical interest only, had the rules themselves not been
ambiguous. Regulation for maternal health can begin at "approximately the
end of the first trimester." 3 This rule apparently rests on a finding of fact
(based on data available in 1972 and reflecting 1972 levels of medical
expertise and technology)3" that at about 12 weeks, mortality in abortion
begins to exceed mortality in full-term childbirth.3 2 Likewise, the Court
noted that viability "is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but
may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks. 3 3 But the detailed rules on permis-
sible state regulation did not specify a particular date for viability ;34 and the
Amendment, 63 CAL. L. REV 1250, 1310 (1975); Ely, supra note 25, at 921 n.19;
Comment, Roe v. Wade and the Traditional Legal Standards Concerning Pregnancy,
47 TEMP. L.Q. 715, 729 (1974).
29. The "health-related" harms to the mother listed in Roe are not exclusively
risks of pregnancy per se: "Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the
woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental
and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all
concerned, associated with the unwanted child . . . .All these are factors the
woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation." 410
U.S. at 153. This paragraph may recognize a right to destroy the fetus, not just to
terminate the pregnancy. But if a state permitted termination of pregnancy, requiring
that the viable fetus be saved if possible, and took over the care of the child so that
maternal responsibility ended with the abortion, could the mere existenceof the child
be a threat to the mother's mental health, warranting its destruction? See Rice, The
Dred Scott Case of the Twentieth Century, 10 HOUSTON L. REV. 1059, 1082-87 (1973);
Tribe, supra note 14, at 27-28 & n.128. But cf. Tribe, supra note 14, at 4 n.24, See
also text at notes 57-75, infra.
30. 410 U.S. at 164.
31. See410 U.S. at 149 n.44. If technology should render abortion at later than 12
weeks of gestation safer than childbirth, the argument can be made that the state can
no longer regulate for maternal health at 12 weeks. But if childbirth becomes safer, or
new statistical evidence reveals that abortion is more dangerous before 12 weeks than
the Court found in Roe, presumably the state could regulate even earlier to protect
maternal health. See Comment, Viability and Abortion, 64 Ky. L.J. 146, 150 n.23
(1975). It is important to note that under Roe, the woman's privacy interest is no
greater before 12 weeks than afterward; rather, the state's interests have not yet
become "compelling." 410 U.S. at 162-64. Should scientific developments cause
either of the state's interests-maternal health or protection of the viable fetus-to
mature prior to 12 weeks, this barrier should fall at least as easily as the 24-week
barrier which was at issue in the instant case.
32. 410 U.S. at 149, 163. See Tribe, supra note 14, at 4.
33. 410 U.S. at 160.
34. Id. at 164.
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Court's explicit statement that a fetus is viable if it might survive "with
artificial aid" 35 seemed to recognize that the moment of viability will
change as medical skill and technology advance. 36
In form, Roe and Doe were "a sort of guidebook, addressing questions
not before the Court and drawing lines with an apparent precision one
generally associates with a commissioner's regulations"; 37 in substance,
however, they were an invitation to legislate and litigate.38
The Missouri law challenged in the instant case was a legislative
attempt to find the limits of Roe and Doe.39 It requires that the attending
physician certify in advance, "with reasonable medical certainty," that the
fetus is not viable. No abortion can be performed without such prior
certification, unless it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the
mother.4 The certification requirement applies to every abortion, even if
performed during the first trimester; its constitutionality was not
challenged. 4'
Plaintiffs did object, however, to the de facto definition of viability. 42
As "artificial life-supportive systems" are developed which enable a fetus
to survive indefinitely when removed from the womb at 18 weeks, 12
weeks, or one week, such a fetus would be viable under the Missouri
definition, and no doctor could certify to the contrary with "reasonable
medical certainty." Such developments would upset the three-stage divi-
sion articulated in Roe. Plaintiffs argued that this definition of viability was
unconstitutional in that it contained no reference to a gestational period,
thereby failing to "incorporate and reflect the three stages of pregnancy." 43
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion" in the instant case clearly holds
35. Id. at 160.
36. The Court noted the potential development of "artificial wombs" as a factor
complicating the determination of when life begins. Id. at 161. See also text at notes
45-49, infra.
37. Ely, supra note 25, at 922 & n.21.
38. See Comment, Implications of the Abortion Decisions: Post Roe and Doe
Litigation and Legislation, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 268 (1974).
39. Section I of the statute stated the legislature's intention "to reasonably
regulate abortion in conformance with the decisions of the supreme court of the
United States." VERNON'S ANN. MO. STAT. § 188.010 (Supp. 1975), enacted by
Missouri Laws 1974, p. 809 § 1.
40. Id. § 188.030 (Supp. 1975), enacted by Missouri Laws 1974, p. 809 § 5.
41. 96 S. Ct. at 2838.
42. See text at note 2, supra.
43. 96 S. Ct. at 2838.
44. Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Powell joined in Justice Black-
mun's opinion. The Court was unanimous in upholding the Missouri statute's
definition of viability. But cf. text at notes 50-57, infra.
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that the three stages of Roe are not immutable barriers to state regulation of
abortion. As the point of viability is advanced, the state's compelling
interest in the "potential life" of the unborn child may be asserted earlier. In
upholding the Missouri definition, Blackmun stressed that the Court in Roe
had "purposefully" left the point of viability "flexible," that this point was
"dependent upon developing medical skill and technical ability," and that
the Roe time periods had been calculated "in the light of present medical
knowledge.""
Standing alone, the Court's upholding of the Missouri definition of
viability might be seen as a major victory for those who wish to protect the
unborn child. Today, viability is generally placed not at 28 weeks but at 20
weeks. 46 One expert has predicted that by 1981, doctors will be able to keep
a "first-trimester" fetus alive indefinitely.47 As the point of viability moves
toward the moment of conception, the Roe formula would seem to advance
the state's compelling interest in the potential life of the viable fetus
accordingly.48 With the development of the artificial womb anticipated in
45. 96 S. Ct. at 2837. "We noted that this point 'is usually placed' at about seven
months or 28 weeks, but may occur earlier." Id. at 2838, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 160 (1973). Two things are noteworthy about this paraphrase of a key sentence in
Roe: the use of quotation marks to draw attention to the word "usually," and the
unexplained omission of half of the Roe formula. In Roe, Justice Blackmun said
viability "may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks," strongly implying that 24 weeks was
an extreme lower limit. Id. at 160. In the instant case, however, his emphasis on
flexibility and advancing technology reflects a recognition that there may be no such
lower limit.
46. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, ILLUSTRATED 1388 (22d ed. 1972). The
point of viability, as defined by the Court in Roe, is when the fetus "potentially" can
survive. 410 U.S. at 160. Since 1971, developments have advanced the point of
viability. See Byrn, supra note 4, at 807 n.5; Comment, Landmark Abortion Deci-
sions: Justifiable Termination or Miscarriage of Justice?, 4 PACIFIC L.J. 821, 854-55
(1973); Roe v. Wade and the Traditional Legal Standards, supra note 28, at 737; J.
Willke, Twenty-One Premature Babies, in Symposium: Life-Death Decisions in
Medicine, presented at Boston Museum of Science, June 26,1976. See B. & J.
WILLKE, HANDBOOK ON ABORTION 25 (revised edition 1975).
47. "Within five years ... we will have life-support apparatus that will allow us
to sustain an embryo removed from the uterus at any stage of development[.]"
Interview with Bernard N. Nathanson, M.D., Good Housekeeping, March 1976, at
69. Dr. Nathanson, an obstetrician-gynecologist associated with St. Luke's Women's
Hospital in New York, is a former director of the Center for Reproductive and Sexual
Health. While technology is now available to overcome many of the problems facing
infants removed from the womb even at the earliest stages of development, rapid
development of total life-support systems such as those envisioned by Dr. Nathan-
son would depend on a major commitment of funds, either from government or the
private sector, to an effort to co-ordinate and apply the technology. No such
commitment has been forthcoming.
48. See note 36 supra.
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Roe, the process would be complete: every unborn child would be a viable
unborn child. From the moment of conception, the woman's right to privacy
would be outweighed by the state's compelling interest in protecting the
viable fetus. Roe would thus contain the seeds of its own obsolescence.49
Other aspects of the instant case, however, confuse the issue.
Prominent among these is the majority dictum that it is not the proper
function of the legislature or the courts to place viability, which
essentially is a medical concept, at a specific point in the gestation
period. The time when viability is achieved may vary with each
pregnancy, and the determination of whether a particular fetus is viable
is, and must be, a matter for the judgment of the responsible attending
physician .0
This statement implies some limitations on the state's ability to impose
sanctions on a physician who is personally not impressed with viability as a
criterion, and who might perform an abortion involving the destruction of a
viable unborn child in the absence of such sanctions. Moreover, the Court
cites, evidently with approval, a federal district court case overturning a
state statute which set viability at 20 weeks. 5' This may indicate that even if
it should become common medical knowledge that the point of viability is
at, for example, 12 weeks, states may not pass statutes acknowledging this
fact. However, if a physican is required to certify with "reasonable medical
49. See Comment, Roe and Doe: Compelling State Interest Test in Substantive
Due Process, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 628, 646 (1973).
50. 96 S. Ct. at 2839.
51. Id. at 2839 & n.5. In Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn.
1974), aff'd sub. nom. Hodgson v. Lawson, - F.2d - (U.S.C.A. 8th Cir. 1976),
the district court rejected the defendants' contention that the 24-28 week standard
of viability mentioned in Roe was "only dicta," and said that "'at any point prior to
24 weeks . . . the state may regulate only insofar as such regulations are related to
maternal health." 378 F. Supp. at 1016. However, in the instant case the Supreme
Court read Hodgson as resting on the district court's finding that "defendants have
presented no evidence . . . that viability does in fact occur at 20 weeks." Id. So the
Court did not say conclusively that such evidence could not be presented in support
of a statutory definition of viability occurring at 20 weeks.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in the instant case, the Eighth
Circuit upheld the Hodgson decision, stating that Roe v. Wade "placed the earliest
point of viability at the twenty-fourth week," and that the Court in Danforth had
"cited with approval" this aspect of Roe. 45 U.S.L.W. 2198. This seems a clear
misreading of the Court's holding in the instant case. See note 45 supra.
The Court in the instant case also cited Wolfe v. Schroering. 388 F. Supp. 631
(W.D. Ky. 1974), which upheld a state statute prohibiting abortions, except for
maternal health reasons, after the fetus could "reasonably be expected to have
reached viability." Wolfe was cited for the proposition that a state need not fix by
statute a specified number of weeks as the point of viability. 96 S. Ct. at 2839.
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certainty" that the fetus is not viable, and if sanctions may be imposed for
abortions performed where such certainty did not exist, then state legislative
enactment of the precise date of viability is not essential to protection of the
fetus.
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Powell,
noted that the Missouri statute does not punish a doctor "for erroneously
concluding that the fetus is not viable." 2 He would have upheld the
definition only on the narrow ground that it "has almost no operative
significance. "5 3 Since there is no punishment, "there is thus little chance
that a physican's professional decision to perform an abortion will be
'chilled.' 
-14 If this caveat were adopted by the Court as a basis to overturn
state laws punishing the abortion of viable unborn children, its effect would
be uncertain:
1) If Justice Stewart means only that a state may not punish a doctor
who, in good faith, erroneously certifies that a fetus is not viable, then
abortion would remain available up to the "upper limit" of medical opinion
as to viability. A doctor could be required to demonstrate that he reasonably
believed the fetus had no potential for survival, even with the aid of artificial
life-support systems.
2) If, however, the concurring opinion implies that the courts could
admit no evidence as to whether a certain fetus was in fact viable at the time
of abortion, or as to the body of medical knowledge defining the limits of
"good faith error"-if, in other words, the doctor's uncontroverted asser-
tion that he believed in good faith that the fetus was not viable would be
sufficient for acquittal, regardless of objective evidence-then a conviction
would be virtually impossible to obtain. Such an unusual restriction on state
law would effectively circumvent the Roe holding that the right to abortion
is not absolute.
Notwithstanding the holding that protection of the viable fetus may
occur prior to 24 weeks, Justice Stewart's suggestion that a state definition
of viability which had any "operative significance" might be unconstitu-
tional,55 together with the majority's apparent confidence in the "judgment
of the responsible attending physician,' 5 6 leaves serious questions as to
how the state may prevent any abortion. 57
52. 96 S. Ct. at 2850.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 96 S. Ct. at 2850.
56. Id. at 2839.
57. Justice Stewart's implication that a law punishing the destruction of a
viable fetus would "chill" a doctor's "professional decision to perform an
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There is another lingering uncertainty: does the state retain an interest
in protecting the viable unborn child, even after a doctor has determined that
an abortion is necessary to preserve the mother's health? The instant case
gives two indications as to what states may do to protect the viable fetus
when a "life or health" abortion is performed. First, the Missouri law
required the physician to take the same care to preserve the life and health of
the fetus as would be required if the fetus were intended to be born alive.
Failure to take such care, where death of the fetus results, would constitute
manslaughter. 58 The court declared this provision unconstitutional on the
narrow ground that it applied to a non-viable as well as to a viable fetus. 59 If
the inference can be drawn that such a manslaughter provision would be
constitutional as applied to a viable fetus, then the Court has implicitly
acknowledged that the state may treat the viable fetus as a person. Such an
inference tends to be defeated, however, by the Missouri Attorney Gener-
al's contention that the manslaughter provision was intended to apply only
when live birth had already resulted.' Moreover, if a state could recognize
the legal personality of the viable fetus in utero, it could presumably forbid
any abortion, even for maternal health reasons, if it threatened the life of the
fetus. This is contrary to the rule of Roe v. Wade.6 Nevertheless, the
Court's language in overturning the Missouri provision strongly suggests
that a state may require a doctor to make every reasonable effort to preserve
the life of a viable fetus, and that the state may impose severe penalties for
failure to make such efforts.
May the state forbid a methodof abortion which will kill a viable fetus?
If there is an alternative method which is reasonably safe for the mother, the
logic of the Court's discussion of the Missouri standard-of-care provision
would indicate that it may.62 The two most widely used methods of
second-trimester abortion are saline injection and prostaglandin. 63 The
abortion" presumably means that some abortions of non-viable fetuses would not
take place because of doctors' fear of prosecution if a "borderline case" should in
fact be viable. The alternative, however; is to allow the abortion of viable
fetuses-'"at least potential" human beings whom the Court has said the state may
protect.
58. VERNON'S ANN. MO. STAT. § 188.035(l) (Supp. 1975), enacted by Missouri
Laws 1974, p. 809 § 6(l).
59. 96 S. Ct. at 2847-48.
60. Id. at 2847.
61. 410 U.S. at 164-65.
62. Cf. Tribe, supra note 14, at 27 & n.120. But cf. Tribe, supra note 14, at 27
n. 118.
63. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831,
2845 (1976). Id. at 2854 (White, J., dissenting).
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latter method merely brings on premature labor, often producing a live
child; the former method almost always kills the fetus.' In the instant case,
the Court invalidated a provision outlawing the saline injection method after
12 weeks of pregnancy. 65 But this holding rested on the Court's finding that
prostaglandins were not widely available in Missouri in 1974, so that
outlawing saline injection abortions had the effect of outlawing virtually all
second-trimester abortions. 66 Also, Missouri purported to assert only its
maternal health interest, not its interest in protecting a viable fetus. 67
Logically, a state's compelling interest in protecting a viable fetus should
include the right to prohibit a method of abortion which may kill or injure the
fetus, provided the prohibition does not threaten maternal health. 68 The
Court's holding on the Missouri saline injection provision does not con-
tradict this conclusion, and its treatment of the standard-of-care provision
supports it.
Advocates of abortion can be expected to challenge the proposition that
the mother's health interest extends only to terminating her pregnancy, and
not to an absolute right to destroy a viable fetus. 69 Where a child results from
rape or incest, or may be deformed, the usual purpose of an abortion is to
prevent the child from being born alive, not just to relieve the mother of the
burdens of pregnancy. There may be instances in which a doctor will argue
that his patient's mental health is endangered by the continued existence of
the child, even if she never sees it.7" Should the Court hold that states may
protect the viable fetus even during "mental health" abortions, it would
leave such women without a remedy acceptable to them. However, if the
64. See Viability and Abortion, supra note 31, at 161 n.81; see also Comment,
Haunting Shadows from the Rubble of Roe's Right of Privacy, 9 SUFFOLK U.L.
REv. 145, 154 n.51 (1974).
65. 96 S. Ct. at 2845.
66. Id. Three Justices would have upheld the Missouri ban on saline amniocen-
tesis. Id. at 2853-4 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Burger, C., and Rehnquist, J.). Three additional members of the Court would
have upheld such a ban "if two abortion procedures had been equally accessible."
Id. at 2856 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see id. at 2851
(Stewart, J., concurring, joined by Powell, J.).
67. Id. at 2844.
68. Cf. Tribe, supra note 14, at 27 & n. 120; Haunting Shadows, supra note 64,
at 153-55. But cf. Tribe, supra note 14, at 27 n.118.
69. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 14, at 4 n.24; Medical Responsibility for Fetal
Survival Under Roe, supra note 25, at 453, 455; note 29, supra.
70. See, e.g., Viability and Abortion, supra note 31, at 148 n. 17. If the inference
may be drawn from the Court's treatment of the Missouri standard-of-care
provision that a state may treat a viable fetus as a "person," then presumably the
right to termination of pregnancy after viability does not include a right to destroy
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invocation of "mental health" is sufficient to grant a right to destroy a
viable fetus, then the exception could soon swallow the rule: some doctors
might regard every unwanted child as a threat to mental health. 7' Given the
broad Doe definition of health,7" it would be impossible to prove them
wrong in court.
In deciding that a state may protect any fetus potentially able to survive
outside the womb with artificial aid, regardless of the period of gestation,
Danforth answered an important question raised by Roe v. Wade. However,
future cases must clarify several questions raised or left unanswered by the
instant case:
1) As advancing technology enables the fetus to survive outside the
womb at much earlier stages of gestation, will the Court continue to affirm
the principle that the state may protect such a fetus, even though the
woman's "right to privacy" is thereby circumscribed much more narrowly
than Roe contemplated?
2) May the state punish a doctor who kills a viable fetus, even where
a trial would involve an investigation into the "good faith" or reasonable-
ness of his medical judgment?
3) Does the mother's health interest include only the right to termi-
nate her pregnancy, and not the right to destroy the viable fetus, when such
destruction is unnecessary to termination? Specifically, when a doctor has
determined that an abortion is necessary to preserve the mother's health,
may the state require that due care be taken to preserve the life of the viable
fetus, and prohibit any method of abortion which will destroy the fetus, so
long as a safe alternative method is available?
If the Court should answer each of these questions in the affirmative,
advancing technology might bring about its own resolution of the abortion
controversy. A woman would have the right to terminate her pregnancy at
any time;73 but the state could require that the child, when removed from the
womb, be given the benefit of artificial life-support systems until such time
as he could live without them. Understandably, however, advocates of a
the fetus, even where maternal health is endangered. But see the discussion of this
point in the text at note 60, supra.
71. See note 29, supra.
72. See text at notes 23-24, supra.
73. Logically, the state's interest in regulating abortion would disappear if fetal
life and maternal health were no longer endangered. Strict application of the Roe
and Doe rules, however, in a situation where medical technology had rendered
every fetus viable, would require only that a woman seeking an abortion find a
physician who regarded the abortion as necessary to preserve her "health" in light
of "all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial and the woman's
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constitutional amendment to protect the unborn child will be unlikely to
abandon their efforts in reliance on hypothetical scientific developments
and on the reasoning of the instant case. Indeed, the Court might prove
reluctant to see the "right to abortion" circumscribed by science, and might
re-strike the Roe balance by answering one or more of the above questions in
the negative-thus rendering the state's "compelling interest" in protecting
the viable unborn child ineffective as a limit on abortion.
Grover Rees, III
PREDIAL LEASES AND PERSONAL RIGHTS
Plaintiff, who purchased property after the expiration of a lease
between his author-in-title and defendant lessee, sought to compel defend-
ant to remove constructions it had erected during the lease. The plaintiff
claimed the right to compel removal by virtue of a specific provision
contained in the lease and on the basis that the lessor's obligations arising
under the lease' continued after its termination. The Louisiana Supreme
Court held on rehearing that the lessor's right to compel removal of
constructions is a personal right that does not pass as an accessory to the sale
of the property. Prados v. South Central Bell, 329 So. 2d 744 (La. 1976).
The distinction between a personal right and a real right2 is not always
clear. A right is deemed personal if it is the correlative of a duty owed by the
person of the debtor; 3 it is termed real if it is a right that confers direct and
immediate authority over the thing of another person." At Roman law this
age-relevant to the well-being of the patient." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192
(1973).
I. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2719, 2720.
2. It is improper to speak only of rights and ignore the function of obligations.
Rights are simply the correlatives of obligations. For purposes of convenience, the
author will use the term "rights," but one should not ignore the obligations which
attach to the rights. See I A. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 113 in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE 337 (1966) [hereinafter cited as YIANNOPOULOS].
3. Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So. 2d 210 (1958); 2 C. Aubry & C. Rau,
DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 172 (7th ed. Esmein 1961) in J. Mayda, 2 CIVIL LAW
TRANSLATIONS 62 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 2 AUBRY & RAU]; YIANNOPOULOs at §
90.
4. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1997, 2010; Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So. 2d
210 (1958); 2 AUBRY & RAU at § 172; 1 M. Planiol, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 2, no. 2158
at 270 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959) [hereinafter cited as I PLANIOL];
Comment, Real Rights in Louisiana, 21 LA. L. REV. 462 (1961).
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